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Making markets work in the public interest: combating hazardous alcohol consumption through 
minimum pricing rules in Scotland 
By Arianna Andreangeli 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Striking an appropriate balance between the realisation of the internal market and the protection of 
public interest goals that are “best left” to the appreciation and action of the member states has 
been a central theme in the development of EU law and in particular of the interpretation of the 
rules on the free movement of goods.  The constant push toward increasing market integration is 
especially visible in the very generous reading given to Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU).  However, upholding this position has led to complex questions as to 
whether this approach may be applicable to all cases: should the existence of a “public interest 
justification” for these types of restraints always be sought in light of the framework for assessment 
provided in Article 36? Or should Article 34 be read more “sparingly” to reflect the need to 
safeguard the integrity of legitimate regulatory powers that the member states enjoy in areas 
identified by the TFEU? 
        The 2015 preliminary ruling concerning the legality, in light of the EU internal market rul es, of 
the Scottish legislation imposing minimum prices calculated per unit of consumption of alcoholic 
beverages brings once again into sharp focus this tension.   While the outcome of the preliminary 
reference procedure and of the domestic litigation is not surprising, this case points to a more 
general question, namely whether the nature of the internal market as a shared competence 
between the EU and the member states should play a role in how this provision is read, especially 
when the free movement rules are relied upon to challenge domestic regulatory measures in areas 
where, as with public health protection, the national authorities are competent to take action . 
       Starting from the example offered by the 2015 SWA preliminary ruling, this paper will examine 
the current approaches to price control rules and then critique them against the wider background 
of the principles governing, respectively, Union action in the field of internal market policy and 
member states’ intervention directed at safeguarding high levels of public health.  It will be argued 
that given the renewed commitment to respecting the principle of conferral, resulting from the 
Treaty of Lisbon, it may be time for a reassessment of the scope of Article 34 TFEU so that the 
member states can continue exercising the legitimate regulatory powers that they enjoy in this area, 
albeit within limits dictated by the demands of a well -functioning internal market.     Having regard 
to national measures designed to address public health protection objectives, it will be suggested 
that since the member states retain significant latitude as regards deciding which measures are both 
"appropriate" and "necessary" to meet "local" health needs, it may have been more consistent with 
the principle of conferral and of subsidiarity to allow the domestic authorities to decide to "sacrifice" 
a degree of price competition in order to tackle complex public policy objectives linked to the 
survival of the local population.   
        Thereafter this article will explore a number of alternative interpretations of Article 34 that can 
help reflect the requirements enshrined in the principles governing the allocation of competences; in 
that context it will review examples emerging from the EU law acquis concerning the application of 
the internal market rules as well as the competition principles.  It will be suggested that conferring a 
more “selective” scope of application to Article 34 could be both possible, in light of existing case 
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law, and consistent with the nature of the internal market as an area of shared competence, whose 
exercise must always comply with the principle of conferral.  It will be submitted that the experience 
of the Canadian federal Courts in dealing with questions of compatibility with federal competition 
law of restraints on the freedom to trade and to compete on grounds of prices imposed by Provincial 
legislation in the public interest could prove especially helpful, to the extent that it is predicated on 
the need to respect the remit of the powers that the Canadian constitutional principle recognises as 
belonging, respectively, to the federal Parliament and to the provincial lawmakers.  
        The paper will conclude that the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act 2012 is a bold and at 
the same time controversial attempt to tackle a “local” public health emergency.  Nonetheless, this 
enactment has exposed once again the tension between the Member States’ “right to regulate” 
their economies for genuine public interest reasons and the EU’s concern  for maintaining the 
integrity of the internal market.  As the Canadian experience has shown, however, the rules 
governing the distribution of powers at different levels of a multi -layered governance structure 
could provide a justification for adopting a more nuanced view of what represents a prohibited 
restraint of the freedom to trade and compete in a borderless, rivalrous market.  While it is 
acknowledged that the concept of ‘regulated conduct defence’ cannot be fully transposed to EU free 
movement law, it is submitted that this notion provides a significant contribution to the debate on 
how the scope of Article 34 TFEU can be reshaped in a way that respects more closely the principle 
of conferral and, consequently, does not compromise the integrity of le gitimate Member States’ 
regulatory powers. 
 
2. Tackling Scotland’s alcohol malaise: a local problem in the wider EU single market—the SWA 
case and its implications 
 
2.1. Free movement of goods and national price control rules “in the public interest”—a 
summary of a complex story 
 
The limited remit of this contribution does not allow for a detailed analysis of CJEU’s case law 
concerning the compatibility of price control rules with the free movement principles.1  In general, it 
may be noted that the CJEU has acknowledged the competence of the member states to regulate 
certain economic activities in order to fulfil goals of public health protection ,2 so long as these 
measures were adopted by the competent national authorities acting in an “official capacity” and in 
areas in which the member states could act.3  In this respect, the member states have been keen to 
continue regulating trade in goods for public interest reasons; however, this action has often 
encroached upon the freedom of movement principles.4 
       A number of CJEU’s judgments have addressed these questions in respect of tobacco trade5 and 
of alcohol sales: in the Van Tiggele6 and Groenveldt 7cases, among others, the Court of Justice held 
that generally applicable rules aimed at regimenting the sale of  certain commodities did not have 
the effect of hindering, whether directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, the pattern of 
interstate trade.8  Nonetheless, the Court has consistently taken the view that price control 
mechanisms, even when they were applicable without distinction to domestic and imported goods, 
                                                                 
1
 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, Case C-148/15, Deutsche Parkinsons Vereingung, Opinion of AG Szpunar, 2 June 
2016, not yet reported, para. 25; see also para. 32-33. 
2
 See inter alia, e.g., case C-198/01, CIF, [2003] ECR I-8055. 
3
 See inter alia case C-267/86, Van Eycke v ASPA, [1988] ECR 4769, para. 15, 17-19; see also CIF, cit. (fn. 2), 
para. 67-71. 
4
 CIF, loc. ult. cit. 
5
 See e.g. case C-13/77, GB-INNO v ATAB, [1977] ECR I-2215. 
6
 Case 82/77, Van Tiggele, [1978] ECR 25. 
7
 Case 15/79, Groenveldt, [1979] ECR 2049. 
8
 Id., para. 13-14. 
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would infringe the EU Treaty if they resulted in imported goods being “(…) placed at a disadvantage 
in relation to identical domestic products either because they cannot profitably be marketed  in the 
conditions laid down or because the competitive advantage conferred by lower cost prices is 
cancelled out.”9 Floor pricing rules were almost inevitably found to infringe Article 34 TFEU expressly 
because they prevent the affected goods, if imported, from being sold at substantially the same 
conditions as in the member state of origin.10   
        In light of the forgoing it is suggested that although the member states remain competent to 
regulate certain economic activities in the public interest, their discretion as to how to go about 
doing so is significantly limited by the reach of Article 34:  11 the cases mentioned earlier indicate that 
maintaining the integrity of price competition represents a “line in the sand” that the national 
authorities cannot cross without infringing the EU freedom of movement rules.12  Consequently any 
national rule that impinges upon this form of competition, even though it aims to secure a genuine 
public interest objective, can only “survive” the consequences of this infringement if it can be shown 
that it “fits” within the requirements of Article 36 of the Treaty .13    
           It may be suggested, not without merit, that requiring the member states to provide this 
justification against the framework of principles of Article 36 is consistent with the function played 
by this provision in the Treaty: however, it can legitimately be queried whether adopting a very wide 
reading of Article 34 in all case may always be the appropriate solution to the question of how to 
reconcile EU-wide concerns for the pursuit of the internal market with the integrity of the member 
states’ regulatory powers.14  It has been acknowledged that scope of the free movement principles 
can be restricted not just upon complying with the conditions enshrined in Article 36, but also to 
fulfil those mandatory requirements that are best assessed and addressed by the national 
authorities.15  More generally it should be noted that the TFEU itself recognises the existence of 
certain competence areas in respect of which the member states remain “sovereign” and therefore 
able to act with significant discretion, while the Union can only exercise very limited powers that are 
only aimed at avoiding impairing the good functioning of the internal market.  16       
          Against this background it is legitimate to question the extent to which it should always be 
possible to rely on Article 34 for the purpose of condemning domestic measures that pursue genuine 
public interest objectives and restrict only “incidentally” and “potentially” the pattern of interstate 
trade and that affect policy areas in respect of which the TFEU allocates often significant discretion 
to the member states17 without encroaching upon the nature of the internal market competence as 
a shared power between the Union and the member states. 18   It is suggested that these issues 
                                                                 
9
 Id., para. 14. 
10
 Id., para. 18, 21; see also, mutatis mutandis, case 15/79, Groenveldt, [1979] ECR 2049, para. 5-7; case C-
279/89, Commission v Belgium, [1991] ECR I -2233, para.21. 
11
 See inter alia Commission v Belgium, cit. (fn. 17), para. 21.  See also case 177 -178/82, van den Haar and 
Kaveka, [1984] ECR 1797, para. 19-21. 
12
 Case 82/77, Van Tiggele, [1977] ECR 25, para. 19, 21; see also mutatis mutandis, Groenveldt, cit. (fn. 6), para. 
7; case 243/83, SA Binon, [1985] ECR 2015, para. 43-44. 
13
 See inter alia Oliver, “When if ever can restrictions on free movement be justified on economic  grounds?”, 
(2016) 41(2) ELRev 147, especially pp. 149, 154-155. 
14
 See e.g. Gormley, “Free movement of goods within the EU: some issues and an Irish perspective”, (2011) 46 
Irish Jurist 74, especially pp. 84-86. 
15
 See e.g. case 145/88, Torfaen BC v B&Q plc, [1989] ECR 3851, especially para. 12-13, 17; case C-110/05, 
Commission v Italy (‘trailers’), [2009] ECR I -519, see e.g. para. 59; case C-368/95, Vereinigte Familiapress v 
Bauer, [1997] ECR I-3689, para. 18.  For commentary, see e.g. Oliver, “Of trailers and jet-skis”, (2009-2010) 33 
Fordham Int’l  L J 1423, see e.g. pp. 1448-1451. 
16
 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits et al., [2001] ECR I-5473, para. 44-45.  
17
 See e.g. case C-145/88, Torfaen BC v B&Q plc, [1989] ECR I -593, para. 10-11. 
18
 See inter alia, more recently, Bartlett, “The EU’s competence gap in public health and non -communicable 
diseases’ policy”, (2016) 5(1) CJICL 50, especially pp. 54 -55; also, mutatis mutandis, Andreangeli, “Healthcare 
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emerge very clearly from the proceedings brought against the 2012 Scottish minimum alcohol 
pricing legislation.   To the extent that the 2012 Act pursued public health protection objectives on 
the basis of the identification of “typically Scottish” demands of protection, this case can be 
considered as a very keen example of the tension existing between the reach of the internal market 
and the integrity of those regulatory powers that the national authorities retain.  The next sections 
will address these questions, starting from the analysis of the SWA preliminary ruling.   
 
2.2. Preserving price competition at the expense of “the health of the nation”? The SWA case 
 
The previous section outlined the approach adopted by the EU Court of Justice when assessing the 
compliance of prima facie generally applicable restraints on the freedom to trade in light of the free 
movement rules and queried whether giving precedent to price competition in all cases, on the 
ground of its being decisive for market integration, could significantly curtail the integrity of the 
member states’ regulatory powers that the rules on competence, contained in the Treaty, confer to 
them.  The purpose of this section is to consider whether these concerns are justified, by focusing on 
the 2015 preliminary ruling relating to the legality of the 2012 Scottish minimum alcohol pricing 
legislation.   
           The Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act 2012 was enacted to address the health, social 
and economic harm arising from hazardous alcohol consumption in Scotland and was consequently 
adopted by the Scottish Parliament as an expression of its devolved powers in the field of public 
health protection.19  By aiming to reduce demand for less expensive alcoholic beverages, especially 
when sold outside licensed premises, the 2012 Act sought to reduce demand among the more 
disadvantaged sections of the population,20 where consumption of high-strength, low-price alcohol 
was most frequent. 21  The Act was however challenged,22 on the ground of it being allegedly 
incompatible with the EU internal market rules.23  
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
services, the EU single market and beyond: Meeting local needs in an open economy—how much market or 
how little market?”, (2016) 43 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 145, especially pp. 160 -161. 
19
 See, for a summary:  https://www.shef.ac.uk/scharr/sections/ph/research/alpol/faq#difference; for 
commentary, see e.g. Ludbroke et al., "Tackling alcohol misuse", (2010) 12(1) Applied Health Econ & Health 
Policy 51.  
20
 See the University of Sheffield's Alcohol Policy Group study generally (available at: 
https://www.shef.ac.uk/scharr/sections/ph/research/alpol/research/sapm in its various iterations) and in 
particular the model for Scotland: 
http://www.shef.ac.uk/scharr/sections/ph/research/alpol/research/completed/scotland (hereinafter referred 
to as ‘the Sheffield Study’).  See also, inter alia WHO, Global Status Report on Alcohol and Health (2014), 
available at: http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/global_alcohol_report/en/ for a full  l ist of 
harmful outcomes associated with alcohol consumption. See also: 
http://www.scotpho.org.uk/behaviour/alcohol/data/availability-affordability-and-consumption; for more 
general World Health Organisation data, see: : 
http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/global_alcohol_report/en/.  
21
 Ibid; see also Sheron et al., "Impact on minimum price per unit of alcohol on patients with l iver disease in 
the UK" (2014) 14(4) Clin Medicine 396, see e.g. pp. 399-400. 
22
 Petition for judicial review by Scotch Whisky Association and others v Scottish Ministers, Inner House, per 
Lord Doherty, 3 May 2013. For a summary of the grounds and of the Opinion, see: http://www.scotland-
judiciary.org.uk/9/1040/Petition-for-Judicial-Review-by-Scotch-Whisky-Association-And-Others.  
23
 Petition for judicial review by Scotch Whisky Association and others v Scottish Ministers, Inner House, per 
Lord Doherty, 3 May 2013. For a summary of the grounds and of the Opinion, see: http://www.scotland-
judiciary.org.uk/9/1040/Petition-for-Judicial-Review-by-Scotch-Whisky-Association-And-Others. See inter alia 
the position of the thinktank, the Adam Smith Institute, at: http://www.adamsmith.org/blog/healthcare/six-
reasons-to-reject-minimum-alcohol-pricing. Also see the initial statement of the SWA, available at: 
http://www.scotch-whisky.org.uk/news-publications/news/scotch-whisky-industry-challenges-minimum-
pricing-of-alcohol/#.Vyoq38v2Zdg.b  
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         Rejecting the challenge, Lord Docherty, speaking for the Outer House, had held that the 2012 
Act did not contravene EU law.  Having regard to the plea that the Act had breached the existing 
Common Market Organisation (CMO) Regulation24 governing the trade of wine, it was stated that 
this Regulation did not prejudice the power of the Member States to rely on, inte r alia, pricing rules 
with a view regulating wine sales within their respective territories, albeit within the constraints 
arising from the observance of the internal market principles. 25  As to the other plea that the 
minimum pricing rules were incompatible with the free movement of goods’ principles, Lord 
Docherty accepted, in line with the acquis, that in principle setting floor prices was incompatible 
with Article 34 TFEU.  Nonetheless, he took the view that such a restriction could be justified in light  
of Article 36 of the Treaty on the ground that it had been both “appropriate” and “necessary” for the 
attainment of a legitimate public interest aim, namely the safeguard of the “health and life of 
humans”.26  
           Unsurprisingly, the petitioner challenged the Outer House decision and, on appeal, the Inner 
House decided, in the event, to suspend proceedings and make a reference to the  EU Court of 
Justice.27  The Luxembourg Court rejected the plea concerning the alleged infringement of the CMO 
Regulation, on the ground that the latter did not prevent member states to adopt measures 
designing the conditions according to which wine should have been sold, 28 including those affecting 
pricing, albeit within limits of ‘appropriateness’ and ‘necessity’ vis-à-vis the attainment of a 
recognised public interest goal.29     Coming to the central issue of the compatibility of the minimum 
pricing rules with Articles 34 and 36 TFEU,30 the Court confirmed that since minimum pricing rules 
prevented “the lower cost price of imported products being reflected in the selling price to the 
consumer” they did not allow importers to market their goods in Scottish markets at the same 
conditions available to them in their country of origin31 and thus infringed Article 34.32   
            The Court examined whether the 2012 Act could be justified in light of Article 36 of the 
Treaty, on the ground of being “appropriate” and “necessary” vis-à-vis securing the protection of 
public health.33  It was acknowledged that the Member States, in accordance with Articles 5 and 168 
TFEU, were entitled to determine the standards of protection of public health that were suitable to 
the needs of their population and that, in that context, could also identify the policy tools that they 
regarded as most appropriate to secure these objectives.34  It was further observed that the 2012 
minimum pricing rules, being part of a “consistent and systematic” attempt at reducing the harmful 
consumption of cheap, higher strength alcohol, thereby limiting the social and health harm arising 
from demands for these commodities,35 could be regarded as an appropriate policy tool to 
improving public health.36 
       Thereafter, the Court considered the “necessity” of the minimum pricing rules, i.e. the question 
of whether any “less restrictive” alternative existed that could have secured the same level of public 
health benefits for the Scottish population. The CJEU recognised that member states could introduce 
generally applicable measures designed to increase the retail price of alcoholic drinks and thereby 
                                                                 
24
 Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council No 1308/2013, [2013] OJ L347. 
25
 Id., para. 90-96. 
26
 Id., para. 53-60; see also para. 74-80. 
27
 Case C-333/14, Scotch Whisky Association v Scottish Ministers, judgment of 23 December 2015, not yet 
reported, hereinafter referred to also as ‘the SWA case’. 
28
 Id., para. 19-20. 
29
 Id., para. 24-26; see also para. 28-29. 
30
 Id., para. 34; see also para. 51 of AG Opinion. 
31
 Para. 31-32 of the judgment.  See also AG Opinion, para. 58. 
32
 Id., para. 31-33; see also para. 58-59 and 64 of the AG Opinion. 
33
 Id., para. 35. 
34
 Id., para. 37-38. 
35
 Id., para. 36-37. 
36
 Id., para. 34. 
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secure important public interest goals37 and observed that tax increases could be regarded as having 
a similar impact on prices vis-a-vis imposing floor prices, thereby leading to a loss in demand for the 
affected goods.38   The Court compared the minimum pricing rules with a hypothetical tax increase  
on alcohol sale prices and stated that to the extent that the latter was generally applicable and did 
not affect the freedom of individual traders to set prices, it represented a far less restrictive policy 
instrument aimed at reducing alcohol demand39 without posing any “serious obstacle to access to 
the UK (and in particular to the Scottish market for the sale of alcoholic beverages. 40    Consequently, 
the Court took the view that the minimum pricing rules would have been “more effective” than a 
generalised tax hike in reducing alcohol related harm by limiting demand.   
         The Court of Justice acknowledged that the 2012 minimum pricing rules could lead to a 
reduction not only of the “hazardous consumption” of alcohol but also of alcohol demand among 
the population as a whole.41  Thus, it was held that the impact of the minimum pricing rules on the 
population as a whole and in particular on “moderate drinkers” should not have been read as 
evidence of lesser effectiveness of the 2012 Act, but to the contrary should have been assessed as 
part of the over-arching appraisal of the ability of the enactment to reducing alcohol consumption 
and therefore alcohol related harm across the whole of Scottish society.42   For this purpose, the 
referring judge should have examined all evidence available on the day of the ruling43 “objectively” 
and “carefully”, albeit without requiring the Scottish Government to prove its case “with absolute 
certainty”.44 
             After resuming proceedings in 2016, the Scottish Court of Session reached a decision on the 
merits of the appeal brought against the Outer House judgment.45  Lord Carloway, speaking for the 
Inner House, found no error in the decision under appeal.  Having regard especially to the 
application of Article 36 TFEU to the case at hand and in that context to the “appropriateness” of the 
measure vis-à-vis its chosen public policy goals, it was held that the Scottish Government enjoyed, in 
light of Article 168 TFEU, significant discretion in assessing how to respond to the public health 
needs of the Scottish population and consequently could have legitimately taken the view that 
imposing floor prices would have been a well-suited response to these demands. 46  In this context, 
the protection of the more disadvantaged strata of the population could have been given priority 
over “shielding” more affluent consumers from the inevitable consequences of any price increases.47 
      As to the proportionality of the measure, Lord Carloway made clear that the appellate judge 
should have confined his cognisance to “comparing the effectiveness of minimum pricing in 
achieving the targeted objectives with other measures” that could both potentially achieve the same 
goals and affect the flow of interstate trade to a lesser extent48 in light of all evidence before it and 
without demanding that the Government prove its case with absolute certainty. 49  Thereafter the 
Court compared the effectiveness, in terms of demand reduction, of imposing floor prices vis-à-vis 
increasing indirect taxation on alcoholic beverages: in its view, while both policy tools affected prices 
and, as a result, would “sooner or later” impact on demand, only minimum pricing could have 
attained the twofold goal of determining a drop in consumption for cheap and widely available 
                                                                 
37
 Id., para. 43. 
38
 Id., para. 44. 
39
 Id., para. 45-46. 
40
 Id., para. 46. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Id., para. 49-50. 
43
 Id., para. 62-63. 
44
 Id., para. 55-57. 
45
 The Scotch Whisky Association v Lord Advocate, judgment of 21 October 2016, [2016] CSIH 77, available at: 
http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/search-judgments/judgment?id=9a1821a7-8980-69d2-b500-ff0000d74aa7.  
46
 Id., para. 168-170. 
47
 Id., para. 173; see also para. 177-180. 
48
 Id., para. 185-186. 
49
 Id., para. 188-189. 
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alcohol, to the benefit of society as a whole, and reducing demand among the “target group”, 
namely the most disadvantaged consumers.50  It was observed that unlike with minimum pricing, the 
greater burden resulting from heaver alcohol taxation could have been “minimised” through acti0n 
on the part of retailers, who could have chosen not to “pass on” the overcharge resulting from the 
hike in taxation through higher retail prices.  51    
         Thus, taking into account the complexities of the pricing strategies usually adopted by alcohol 
sellers—especially by supermarkets—Lord Carloway held that the impact of greater fiscal imposition 
on demand would have been too remote and uncertain in practice for it to be effective at reducing 
demand.52   Finally, the judgment considered to what extent the 2012 Act would have impacted on 
the interstate trade flows: it was acknowledged that producers of certain imported drinks ( such as 
“Bulgarian wines”) could have been forced to set higher prices in Scotland compared with those 
charged elsewhere within the EU.  Nonetheless, he took the view that due to the small size of 
demand in Scotland for this type of foreign drinks, compared with the UK and also with the Union at 
large, this effects were likely to be “minor”.53 
      While the limited remit of this contribution does not allow for an in-depth analysis of the Court of 
Session’s appeal judgment, a few observations may be made.  It is suggested that the SWA 
preliminary ruling could have been read as a telling example of the scepticism with which the CJEU 
had dealt with similar arguments thus far.54    By contrast, it is argued that the Inner House’s decision 
represents a restatement of both the need to preserve the integrity of national regulatory 
prerogatives in areas where the member states enjoy wide margins of appreciation, in accordance 
with the Treaty’s competence rules: it is suggested that the fact that the appellate judge adopted a 
standard of review that was “objective” and acknowledged that the Government was not under an 
obligation to prove its case with “absolute certainty” appeared consistent with the nature and 
intensity of the powers that each member state enjoys in respect of addressing demands of public 
health protection, according to Article 168 TFEU.55 
          It can certainly be agreed with Lord Carloway that the SWA case has once again “thrown into 
sharp focus a measure, which a Government deems to be one which will serve to improve the 
nations’ health, with the commercial interests of the producers and sellers of alcohol”, whose right 
to sell their commodities freely across the single market is protected by Article 34 TFEU.56  In this 
context, Article 36 TFEU has once again provided the framework within which the member states 
can articulate a public policy justification for regulatory measures hindering—at least potentially—
the pattern of trade among member states.57  Nonetheless, it is submitted that the breadth with 
which Article 34 is read may be at odds with other important rules, i.e. those governing the 
allocation of powers at national and at EU level.58   
       It is reminded that with the Treaty of Lisbon the principles of conferral and subsidiarity have 
been confirmed as two central tenets within the overarching structure of the EU Treaties. 59  Thus, it 
is argued that to the extent that the judicial application of Article 34 fall s within the exercise, on the 
part of the Union, of its internal market competence, which is a power shared with the member 
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 Id., para. 202-203. 
54
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 See case C-333/14, cit. (fn. 29), para.38-41.  For commentary, see e.g. Oliver, “Of trailers and jet skis”, (2009 -
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 Inner House, Court of Session, cit. (fn. 50), per Lord Carloway, para. 8. 
57
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 See id., pp. 1423, 1469-1470. 
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states, the way in which this rule is interpreted should be influenced by and comply with the 
requirements of the principle of conferral,60 for it is only by doing so that the question of whether 
the EU’s “integrationist imperative” cam be achieved without compromising the integrity of the 
member states’ regulatory prerogatives, in light of the TFEU itself can be addressed.61  But how can 
this “alternative take” on the freedom of movement rules be framed? The next sections will explore 
these broader issues having regard more closely to the complex interaction between the 
implementation of the internal market goals and the member states’ exercise of their powers in the 
field of public health protection. 
 
3. Between national public health demands and the pursuit of open, competitive markets: 
“restructuring Article 34 TFEU?” 
 
3.1. Price competition, non-discrimination and the public interest: who wins? Seeking to attain 
local public health demands in the internal market as a “shared regulatory space” 
 
The previous sections sketched the approach adopted by the CJEU in respect of the review of 
domestic price control rules in light of the free movement principles and thereafter examined its 
application in the context of the litigation concerning the Scottish minimum alcohol pricing 
legislation.  In light of this analysis it was questioned whether giving precedence to price competition 
as a means of achieving market access could be appropriate in all cases, especially when the prima 
facie restrictions on the free movement of goods stemmed from measures adopted by the member 
states in areas belonging to their competences, in light of the Treaty itself.   
         This section will examine how such a complex interplay between the EU’s focus on market 
integration, on the one hand, and the member states’ concern for continuing to exercise their 
regulatory powers in areas assigned to them by the EU Treaties can be negotiated.  It is well-known 
that CJEU had already had the opportunity to deal with concerns for the “creeping” expansion of the 
scope of Article 34 that had been raised in several cases where the EU’s “market integration 
mission” had been considered to encroach upon the member states’ ability to pursue legitimate 
public interest goals.62  While certain decisions were hailed as providing a more “balanced” answer 
to this question, other, comparatively more numerous judgments indicated how the Court of Justice 
had applied this “more selective” view of Article 34 rather reluctantly. 63  Accordingly, it can 
legitimately be doubted whether the current, dominant interpretation of the free movement of 
goods’ principle can actually respond to the demands of the principle of conferral,64 since it does not 
appear to consider either the shared nature of the internal market competence or the demands the 
integrity of the member states’ regulatory powers.65 
                                                                 
60
 See Horsley, cit. (fn. 65), p. 734-735. 
61
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145/88, Torfaen BC v B&Q plc, [1989] ECR I -593; C-142/05, Mickelsson and Roos, [2009] ECR I -4273. For 
commentary see e.g. Horsley, cit. (fn. 61), pp. 751 ff.; also Yeo, “Discrimination or market access? Re-
evaluating the EU’s organisation of the internal market”, (2008) 4(2) CSLRev 315, pp. 321 -322. 
63
 See inter alia case C-441/04, A-Punkt Schmuckhandels GmbH v Claudia Schmidt, [2006] ECR I -2209, para. 17-
21, see also para. 9; also case C-142/05, Mickelsson and Roos, [2009] ECR I -4273, e.g. para. 24, 27-28; case C-
110/05, [2009] ECR I-519; for commentary, see e.g. Yeo, cit. (fn. 77), p. 322. More recently, see, mutatis 
mutandis, case C-531/07, Fachverband der Buch v LIBRO, [2009] ECR I-276, para. 17; see also para. 22-23.  For 
commentary, see Spaventa, “Leaving Keck behind?”, (2009) 34(6) ELRev 914, p. 917, 924.  
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 See inter alia Horsley, cit. (fn. 65), pp. 936-937; also Spaventa, cit. (fn. 70), pp. 922-923; see also, mutatis 
mutandis, e.g. C-372/04, Watts, [2006] ECR I-325, para. 105-106; see also para. 92; more recently, mutatis 
mutandis, case C-531/07, Fachverband der Buch v LIBRO, [2009] ECR I -276, para. 17. 
65
 See Horsley, loc. ult. cit. 
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          But how can an alternative take on Article 34 be construed? And in which case may it be 
necessary to adopt it? It is observed that the latter question strikes at the core of the interplay 
between the internal market competence which, as stated earlier, is shared between the Union and 
the member states, and the integrity of those powers that the Treaty leaves to the national 
authorities.  It is clear that Article 5 TFEU draws a clear distinction between joint competences, in 
respect of which the Union can take action subject to the principle of subsidiarity, and 
“coordinating” and “supporting” competences, in respect of which the EU can only take very limited 
action and solely for the purpose of securing the good functioning of the internal market.  66   
          Against this background, it is argued that if the internal market is to remain a “shared 
regulatory space” where the EU and the member states can act each in the respective areas of 
competence, the shape of Article 34, which represents one of the “tools” through which the goal of 
market integration can be achieved, cannot and should not be stretched as far as to impinge upon 
the integrity of other powers that the TFEU may have conferred to the member states. 67  It is 
suggested that the pursuit of high standards of public health protection represents a good e xample 
of a policy area where the member states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation and in respect of 
which the Union, instead, can only act for the purpose of “supporting, coordinating and 
complementing” their action, so as to protect the efficiency of the internal market.   
         The limited remit of this contribution does not permit any in-depth consideration of the 
relationship between the free movement rules and the concerns for maintaining high levels of public 
health protection in each member state.  Suffice to say that, on the one hand, according to Articles 5 
and 168 TFEU it is primarily for the member states to determine the needs of their populations and 
to decide how to address the health demands of the local populations.  On the other hand, i t has 
been accepted that medical services, even when they are supplied by public bodies and financed by 
general taxation, are subject to the free movement principles. 68   It is however clear that these 
services are of “sensitive nature”.69  Consequently, absent common rules governing their provision, 
the member states’ authorities should be recognised the power to assess the needs of public health 
within their respective jurisdiction and, consequently, should be free to determine the entitlement 
to services, the ways in which to supply these service and how to finance them, 70 to maintain good 
standards of public health and protect the financial stability, the continuity and the consistency of 
care.71   
        However, the CJEU has expressly stated that the exercise of the national competences in this 
area could not occur at the expenses of the good functioning the internal market.  Consequently, 
any national requirements governing the provision of these services in cross-border circumstances 
must be both “appropriate” and “necessary”, be inspired by objective and non -discriminatory 
criteria and applied in a non-arbitrary way.72    The EU, on its part, can only adopt those measures 
that ensure mutual coordination between national authorities so that the exercise of those 
discretionary powers does not unduly hinder the free movement of services 73 and accordingly, only 
                                                                 
66
 See inter alia, mutatis mutandis, Andreangeli, “Healthcare services, the EU single market and beyond”, 
(2016) 43(2) LIEI 145, pp. 150-152. 
67
 See inter alia, Horsley, cit. (fn. 65), pp. 751-752; also mutatis mutandis, Spaventa, cit. (fn. 70), pp. 921-923. 
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 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, case 159/90, SPUC v Grogan, [1991] ECR I -4685, para. 18. 
69
 See e.g. Declaration of the Contracting Parties on Article 168(4) TFEU, attached to the TFEU and agreed at 
the Lisbon Inter-Governmental Conference.  For commentary, see inter alia Prosser, The Limits of Competition 
Law, 2005: Oxford, OUP, p. 7; see also p. 9. 
70
 Cases 286/82 and 26/83, Luisi and Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro, [1984] ECR 377, para. 16. See also case C-
156/98, Kohll, [1998] ECR I-1931, para. 20. 
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 Ibid. 
72
 See e.g. Watts, cit. (fn. 135), para. 86-92. See also case C-156/98, Kohll, [1998] ECR I-1931, para. 73-74, 87-
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 See e.g. case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits et al., [2001] ECR I-5473, para. 44-45; see also, e.g. Directive of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 9 March 2011No 24 on the application of patients’ rights in cross -
border healthcare, [2011] OJ L88/45, Preamble, Recital 10-11. 
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enjoys the power to “coordinate, complement and support” the action of the member states in this 
area.74  Subject to an assessment of whether any limitations placed on the freedom of movement of 
these services are “inherent” to the attainment of public policy  goals, in the sense of being 
“appropriate” and “strictly proportionate” to their achievement, the relevant domestic rules were 
regarding as falling outside the remit of the internal market principles. 75   
          Against this background, it is legitimate to query whether, if the nature of the powers enjoyed 
by the national authorities in this field was taken into account in the scrutiny of a measure akin to 
the Scottish minimum alcohol pricing laws, the CJEU could have decided the case in a different way 
and, if this had been the case, how this “conferral-influenced” approach could have been framed.    
Having regard to the specific question of the legality, in light of the EU internal market principles, of 
the 2012 Act, it is acknowledged that unlike the domestic rules relating to the organisation and 
provision of healthcare services, the Scottish minimum unit pricing legislation pursue a more general 
aim, namely safeguarding “the health of the nation”.  It is also recognised that the minimum alcohol 
pricing rules affect directly an essential aspect of rivalry within the internal market.  Nonetheless, it 
is suggested that the adoption of the 2012 legislation entailed a similar assessment of the health 
demands of the Scottish population, with a view to designing the measures that are regarded as 
appropriate to address these needs.  
          It is therefore argued that, since in enacting the minimum alcohol pricing rules the Scottish 
Parliament was acting within the scope of its public health protection competence, the scope of 
Article 34 TFEU, in as much as it is applicable to the 2012 Act, should be restricted in a way that 
reflects the nature of the powers exercised by the member states and in that context protects the 
margin of appreciation that they enjoy in this area.76  It is suggested that the renewed commitment 
to observing the principle of conferral as a means of ensuring the legality of EU action and thereby 
maintain the integrity of the powers enjoyed by the member states in specific policy areas—such as 
public health protection—could have provided a powerful justification for seeking to exclude the 
2012 Act from the remit of Article 34 TFEU: subject to an assessment of whether any “incidental 
impact” on the pattern of interstate trade had restricted the flow of imports more than it was strictly 
necessary to attain these objectives, the minimum alcohol pricing rules could have been regarded as 
falling outside the scope of Article 34, on the ground of being “appropriate” to fulfilling the public 
interest demands they had sought to address.  77  
           It is further observed that an interesting parallel can be drawn between the approach 
proposed above and the framework for the assessment of certain restrictions on the freedom of 
movement of goods provided by the CJEU in its Torfaen judgment, namely the “Mandatory 
Requirements” doctrine.  As is well known, in that decision the Court of Justice had been able to 
exclude from the scope of Article 34 TFEU those national measures that aimed to address genuine 
public policy concerns arising from the “economic and socio cultural characteristics” of local 
population and conformed to criteria of “inherency”, i.e. to conditions of “strict necessity” and of 
“suitability” of the objective that they pursued.78  This approach may usefully be compared with the 
CJEU’s appraisal of the 2012 Act,: it is clear that the Scottish minimum alcohol pricing rules were 
regarded as providing a “coherent and rational response” to public policy demands that were typical 
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of the Scottish population and that the Scottish Parliament was competent to assess and on that 
basis to decide how to respond to, in accordance with Article 168 TFEU.79   
           Accordingly, it could be argued that the CJEU could have assessed whether any restrictions on 
the freedom of movement that this legislation entailed were “intrinsic” to the achievement of the 
beneficial effects pursued by the national authorities in light of Article 34 TFEU, in accordance with 
the above pattern of analysis.80      It is submitted that the Court of Justice might have engaged with 
two questions: first of all, it could have examined the nature of the competence that the member 
states have exercised, the margin of discretion that they enjoy, in light of the Treaty and the 
corresponding issue of whether the Union enjoyed any power to act in the same area.  In this 
specific context, it would have been necessary also to consider whether any Union’s competence is 
shared or merely “supporting” or “coordinating”.81  And second, the Court could have analysed the 
purpose and content of the measure so as to decide whether the latter was “genuinely regulatory” 
in nature:  if the measure in issue was “appropriate” to securing goals for which the member states 
remain competent to take action and did not affect the effectiveness of the fre e movement rules 
more than what was strictly necessary to secure its goals, it should fall outside the scope of Article 
34 TFEU.82    
          It is therefore argued that thanks to a scrupulous assessment of the ‘appropriateness’ and of 
the ‘inherency’ of the measure at issue in each case the scope of Article 34 could therefore be 
“redesigned” to reflect more accurately the allocation of competences at EU and at national level in 
this area. 83  It should, however, be noted that, as was suggested by certain commentators, 
extending any approach akin to the “Mandatory Requirements” doctrine to  domestic price control 
rules may not be entirely apposite. It was argued in this respect that to the extent that rules of this 
kind would prevent traders to compete in a specific member states “as if they were at home” in all 
respects and especially in respect of pricing, they would almost inevitably be contrary to the 
principle of non-discrimination and therefore could only be justified in light of the framework for 
assessment enshrined in Article 36 TFEU.84   It is acknowledged that this principle is central to the 
internal market and cannot be derogated unless when this is expressly allowed under the TFEU: 
however, it is argued that the equally fundamental nature of the principle of conferral could support 
the adoption of the more “selective” reading of Article 34 suggested above even in cases concerning  
the legality of pricing rules, so long as it can be established that similar enactments represent a 
“genuine”  attempt to regulate a specific market to address genuine public health needs and have 
therefore “nothing to do with regulating imports”.85     
           In light of the forgoing it is concluded that for the nature of its subject-matter the SWA case 
not only provided a telling example of the tension existing between the pursuit of the internal 
market goals and the need to maintain the integrity of the member states’ powers to regulate 
certain sectors of their economy in the public interest.  It also offered an opportunity to consider 
whether, in light of the emphasis placed by the Treaty of Lisbon on the principle of conferral, the 
latter could have in any way influenced the interpretation of Article 34 TFEU.86    It is however clear 
that the “Mandatory Requirements” doctrine is not the only “source of inspiration” for constructing 
an alternative approach to the established interpretation of Article 34: the next section will briefly 
analyse how EU competition law has dealt with the similar question of how prima facie competing 
                                                                 
79
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concerns for safeguarding, on the one hand, effective competition and, on the other hand, 
introducing an enforcing economic regulation at national level can be reciprocally counterbalanced.   
 
3.2. Looking for a ‘conferral-influenced’ reading of Article 34 TFEU: borrowing from EU 
Competition law? 
 
The previous section provided a brief critique of the approach adopted by the CJEU vis -à-vis the 
review of the Scottish minimum alcohol pricing legislation in light of the Court’s acquis concerning 
the complex interplay existing between the realisation of the internal market and the achievement 
of public health protection objectives, in light of Article 168 TFEU.  Nonetheless, it was also queried.  
The purpose of this section is to address the question of whether, in the context of this “new look” 
at Article 34, it may have been necessary to reinforce the criterion of ‘inherency’ to safeguard the 
efficiency of the internal market, especially vis-à-vis price control rules. 
          It may be recalled from section 3.1 that at the core of the approach adopted in Torfaen had 
been the requirement for prima facie restrictive domestic measures not to adversely affect the flow 
of interstate trade more than was necessary for the achievement of their stated goals.  This problem 
is, however, not unique to the interpretation of the EU rules on freedom of movement, but has also 
been addressed in the context of EU competition law: in cases such as Wouters and Meca Medina 
the Court of Justice, retreating from a hitherto wide interpretation of the prohibition of anti -
competitive arrangements, contained in Article 101(1), had excluded from the remit of this provision 
arrangements which restricted the freedom to trade of the parties to, inter alia, achieve public 
interest goals that justified adopting regulatory measures applicable to certain economic activities,87 
if the prima facie restrictive arrangement addressed demands of public interest and did not restrict 
the freedom to compete on the market more than was necessary to achieve its stated objectives.88   
          It is acknowledged that the approach discussed so far, to the extent that it had been 
motivated, at least in part, by a concern for ensuring a more "economics-based" interpretation of 
the competition rules, may not be fully transposed to the scrutiny of state measures having a prima 
facie discriminatory impact on imports in light of the free movement rules. 89  Nonetheless, it is 
submitted that there may be a powerful argument in favour of extending some of its elements to 
the way in which Article 34 TFEU should be read. In general, it must observed that both the free 
movement principles and the competition rules pursue the same overarching objective, i.e. the 
creation of a well-functioning internal market and have faced the same challenge of having to 
reconcile the attainment of the market integration imperative with other, often non-economic 
objectives.90   
             It is acknowledged that in the context of competition law the notion of “state-action 
defence” has sought to respond to this challenge, to the extent that  it has sought to limit the scope 
of the EU competition law to exclude prima facie anti-competitive conduct which is not the outcome 
of an independent decision on the part of the undertakings concerned, on the ground of being 
required under a genuinely regulatory scheme, and which does not restrict completely the ability of 
the affected firms to compete on the market.91  Nonetheless, it is argued that, to the extent that 
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both the “Mandatory Requirements” doctrine and the “more economics-based approach” to Article 
101(1) outlined above are inspired by broader principles of reasonableness and of proportional ity, it 
is justified to propose that the latter may contribute to the development of a more “scrupulous” 
reading of the test enshrined, in the context of Article 34, by the EU Court of Justice in the Torfaen 
judgment.92  
        It is suggested that those national rules that interfere, actually or potentially, with the pattern of 
inter-state trade only “incidentally”, on the ground of pursuing a genuine public interest objective 
should not be regarded as falling within the remit of the freedom of movement of goods’ rule if two 
conditions are met.  First of all, it must be shown that these rules are clearly “appropriate” to secure 
a specific public policy goal, the attainment of which is left by the TFEU to the national authorities 
(as is the case with public health protection, in accordance with Article 168 TFEU): in this context it is 
also indispensable to consider how wide the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national 
authorities is, in light of the TFEU provisions.93   And second, it must be established that they 
interfere with interstate trade only to the extent that it is ‘strictly necessary’ to attain a specific 
public policy objective—in other words, that no ‘as effective’ alternative policy tool exist that is less 
“offensive” of the freedom of movement principles.94 
         It can therefore be concluded that reconciling the achievement of the internal market goals 
within the framework of conferred competences enshrined in the TFEU is a very complex question to 
which Article 34 TFEU cannot give a full answer.  Especially when, as a result of domestic regulatory 
intervention affecting certain economic activities, assessing the function and the impact of that 
intervention on market entry and expansion, especially of producers of imported goods proves 
inevitably complex,95  the demands of the principle of conferral could prompt the question whether 
it may be justifiable to assign to the goal of market integration a “pre -eminent” role vis-à-vis other 
equally important public interest objectives, in respect of which the membe r states are recognised 
as being “sovereign”. 96    
          The forgoing analysis has suggested that it may indeed be possible to read Article 34 TFEU in a 
more “discerning” way and to incorporate in its interpretation issues of competence.  In this conte xt, 
recourse to a “sharper” concept of ‘inherency’, elaborated in light of the competition law judgments 
in Meca Medina and Wouters, might ensure that only “strictly proportionate” restrictions on the 
freedom to trade, imposed for genuine public policy reasons, would be allowed to avoid the 
consequences of an infringement of the freedom of movement principles.  97   Nonetheless, this is by 
no means the only approach that could potentially be adopted to fulfil this objective.  The next 
section will briefly explore the way in which the Canadian courts have addressed similar questions 
arising from the apparent “tension” between attaining open and rivalrous markets, through the 
application of the federal competition rules, if necessary by restraining the freedom to trade and 
compete in certain industries for public interest reasons.  
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3.3. Tales from across the Atlantic: alcohol control and minimum pricing rules in provincial 
Canada—between securing competitive markets and maintaining local regulatory integrity 
 
The previous sections analysed the current approach to the interpretation of Article 34 in cases 
involving price control rules and argued that the renewed commitment, resulting from the Treaty of 
Lisbon, to observing the principles underscoring the exercise of Union competences could justify 
moving toward a more restrictive interpretation of Article 34 TFEU as a result of which domestic 
rules adopted to foster genuine regulatory objectives in areas where the member states retain the 
competence to act, could be found to fall outside the scope of that provision, subject to a close 
assessment of their “appropriateness” and “necessity”.  
           The purpose of this section will be to consider whether further insights as  to how such a 
“selective approach” to Article 34 TFEU could be constructed may be gleaned from the experience of 
a foreign jurisdiction where the freedom to compete on grounds of price  in the alcoholic beverages’ 
industry has been significantly constrained by local regulation, namely Canada.  It is certainly 
acknowledged that the EU is not comparable to a fully-fledged federal state, where clear boundaries 
exist as between the powers conferred to the central authorities and those belonging to “local” 
authorities”.98  Nonetheless, it is reminded that the EU, being an organisation governed by the 
principle of conferral, can only act in those areas in which it enjoys the power of doing so and to this 
end must comply with the principles of conferral and subsidiarity, so as not to impair the integrity of 
regulatory prerogatives that the member states maintain, in light of the Treaty. 99  Accordingly, it is 
argued that respecting the way in which power is allocated at “different levels” in a multi -layered 
governmental structure is a concern that is common to both the EU, as a “sui generis” international 
legal order, and to a sovereign state that is characterised by having a federal structure.  It is 
therefore suggested that an examination of the Canadian response to these question especially in 
respect of the compatibility of provincial rules affecting the supply and retail of alcoholic beverages 
with federal competition law could prove helpful for the purpose of developing an alternative, more 
discerning approach to Article 34 TFEU in a case such as the SWA challenge.   
       The limited remit of this article does not allow for an in-depth examination of the complex issues 
arising from the interplay between federal legislation and provincial enactments in light of Canadian 
constitutional law.  Suffice to say in this respect that section 92 of the Constitutional Act of Canada 
safeguards the power of the provincial assemblies to regulate, among other matters, “property and 
civil rights”, including commercial matters enjoying local significance.100  Section 91, by contrast, 
accords to the Federal Parliament the prerogative to enact legislation effective across the whole of 
Canada which is designed to regulate issues that enjoy a significance going beyond the confines of 
an individual province.101  Thus, while the provincial assemblies could enact rules designed to govern 
commercial matters having a provincial remit, such as the trade in securities within an individual 
Province,102 “the incorporation (…), the powers of companies” and the “limitations” to which the 
latter should be subjected were matters for federal legislation,103 on the ground that they would 
have an impact on “trade and commerce” throughout Canada.104   
           There are cases, however, where the boundary between “local” and “nation -wide” 
competences is not immediately obvious.  In the same McCutcheon decision it was expressly 
acknowledged that there may be issues that, by their very nature are  amenable to being regulated 
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by both the federal parliament and by the provincial assemblies.105  As was aptly put by Dickson J, 
“(…) when (…) the corporate-security federal and provincial characteristics of the insider trading 
legislation are roughly equal in importance there would seem little reason, when considering 
validity, to kill one and let the other live. (…)”106  
       Consequently, a question emerges as to how to resolve conflicts arising from the exercise of 
these prima facie concurrent powers.  If in a specific case a “real operational conflict” was found 
between provincial and federal legislation--i.e. “(…) it [would be] impossible to comply 
simultaneously with both provincial and federal enactments (…)”107—which enactment would 
prevail? In, inter alia, the Rothmans et al. judgment it was held that in a similar situation the 
application of the federal statute would displace that of the provincial provisions  to prevent 
“inconsistent   local legislation” from jeopardising the federal Parliament’s objectives,108 so as to 
maintain the unity and consistency of the interpretation and application of Canadian federal 
statutes. 109  Nonetheless, it is legitimate to query whether this principle of “paramountcy” finds any 
limits as regards its scope of application, so as to allow the provincial assemblies to exercise their 
regulatory powers in order to meet “local” public interest needs. 110 This question is central to the 
interaction existing between the competition rules, enshrined in the Competition Act 2009 and 
having effect throughout the Canadian federation, and the provisions that the provincial assemblies 
have adopted to discipline certain forms of commerce, such as the alcohol trade.   
           At the outset, it should be noted that “liquor control” has consistently fallen within the remit 
of the provincial assemblies’ normative powers, on the ground of being a “local matter”: with the 
notable exception of Alberta,111 however, there is a common trait characterising the substance of 
these regulatory interventions, namely that in all provinces the sale of alcoholic beverages has been 
subjected to very pervasive and wide-ranging restrictions.  These restraints have encompassed the 
creation of public monopolies on the wholesale commerce of liquor, the imposition of advertising 
and retail trade requirements and the imposition of price controls.112   
         It may be queried how such an “intrusive” regulatory framework can be reconciled with the 
federal competition rules.  In general, according to the Canadian Competition Act serious 
infringements such as price-fixing or bid rigging attract criminal liability.  113   Other, less serious 
competition law breaches instead are regarded as being “reviewable matters” and lead, after an 
investigation by the Competition Bureau, to the imposition of financial penalties, for which the 
Competition Tribunal is competent.114 It is also emphasised that unlike in US antitrust law, there is 
no sharp distinction between ‘per se’ and ‘rule of reason’ infringements, but that the relevant legal 
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standard can be found to lie “on a continuum” between these two approaches, having close regard 
to the definition and the characteristics of the relevant market and to the nature of each practice. 115    
Having regard more specifically to minimum pricing, thanks to the 2009 reforms Canadian 
competition law regards these arrangements, including resale price maintenance, as a “reviewable 
matter”,116 which will therefore attract financial sanctions if the Competition Tribunal can be 
satisfied that these arrangements, on the balance of probabilities, could distort competition wither 
by facilitating coordination among the concerned parties or by preventing rivals from entering in or 
expanding on the relevant market.117 
        Against this background it can be suggested that in Canada a complex and multi -layered 
structure exists for the regulation of the economy, with the federal authorities being responsible for 
governing trade and commerce on a nation-wide basis and the provincial assemblies remaining 
empowered, in accordance with the constitutional rules governing the allocation of legislative 
powers, to regiment certain sectors of the economy “on a provincial basis”, i.e. to address local 
needs which they are recognised as being best placed to assess and act upon. 118  In this context, it 
may be legitimately queried whether the scope of the principle of paramountcy should be influenced 
by the concern for upholding the integrity of the regulatory powers that the provinces continue to 
enjoy, in light of Article 92 of the Constitution Act, even when the exercise thereof can lead to the 
flow of trade across the Canadian federation being limited. 
         In general, the Supreme Court of Canada recognised the legitimacy of federal competition 
legislation as a means of regulating trade and commerce through both the threat of criminal 
sanctions and the provision of civil remedies, ranging from cease-and-desist orders to damages 
liability for infringers,119 on the ground of it being “(…) an example of the genre of legislation that 
could not practically or constitutionally be enacted by a provincial government (…)”:  in its view, 
since “(…)  Canada is, for economic purposes, a single huge marketplace (…) competition (…) must be 
regulated federally. (…)”120   A question, therefore, emerges as to the extent to which, thanks to the 
principle of paramountcy, the enforcement of the competition rules may in any way impact on the 
power of the provincial assemblies to regulate "purely provincial matters" and in that context, 
"local" issues affecting rights or obligations within their territorial jurisdiction,121 including intra-
provincial trade.122              
            In R v Simoneau it was held that conduct aimed at complying with regulatory obligations 
imposed by provincial assemblies would remain immune from the applicability of federal legislation, 
including the Competition Act123 and therefore did not attract antitrust liability, so long as these 
prima facie anti-competitive practices conformed to local regulation and pursued a genuine public 
policy goal in the interest of that industry and of society at large, as determined by the provincial 
legislature in accordance with the powers conferred to it by the Constitution. 124 
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        The forgoing analysis illustrates that the Canadian Courts have constructed a legal justification—
namely the Regulated Conduct Defence (RCD)—to “immunise” from the consequences of a finding 
of a competition infringement prima facie restrictive behaviour, on the basis of the application of the 
constitutional rules aimed at protecting the integrity of Provincial legislative prerogatives vis -à-vis 
the overarching power to legislate for the whole Federal jurisdiction enjoyed by the Parliament in 
Ottawa.  It is suggested that the RCD, to the extent that it limits the scope of application of the 
Competition Act vis-à-vis genuinely “regulated conduct”, serves the function of counterbalancing the 
demands of the effective enforcement of federal antitrust rules with the integrity of the 
constitutional prerogatives enjoyed by the provincial assemblies in light of Section 92 of the 
Constitution Act.   
         In earlier case law the defence was read relatively generously as “immunising” from 
competition liability not just conduct that was mandated by provincial regulation, but also practices 
that were simply permissible under it,125 on the ground that arrangements compliant with provincial 
statutes could not be said to “operate to the detriment of or against the interest of the public”. 126   
Over time, however, concerns were raised that this generous reading of the RCD would have 
hampered the effective enforcement of the Competition Act, especially in regulated industries.127  
Thus, in Waterloo Law Association v Canada the Supreme Court of Canada held that 'regulated 
conduct' could avoid a criminal sanction only if it was “required” by a “governing body” acting in 
accordance with powers delegated to it by a provincial statute.  128 Consequently, a common 
“regulated fee schedule” agreed upon by practising lawyers who were members of the organisation, 
could not be “immunised” from competition scrutiny ,129 since nowhere had the provincial statute 
conferred on the governing body of the legal profession in Ontario the power to set and enforce a 
common fee scale among its members.130 Absent any recognition of the practice required nor 
allowed under the relevant professional regulatory scheme, 131 regulated professionals such as 
lawyers, could not be immune from antitrust liability.132         
          It is suggested, in light of the forgoing, that the current reading of the regulated conduct 
defence responds to overarching concerns for achieving a “stable equilibrium between federal and 
provincial jurisdiction" and in this context to rebalance the relationship between sector regulation, 
which is often a "local matter", and the application of the federal competition statutes.  133   Thus, on 
the basis of a “functional” reading of the Competition Act and the provincial legislation, only conduct 
that is “necessarily incidental to the industry (or profession)” would be  “immunised” by the 
regulated conduct defence.134  Behaviour that is merely “fortuitously or coincidentally connected” 
with the exercise of regulated trades would instead be caught by the competition rules.135 
        In light of the above analysis, it may be queried to what extent the RCD has had any impact on 
the competition law scrutiny of liquor control rules, including those restricting the freedom to set 
prices.  This general question was considered by the Supreme Court in the Canadian Breweries 
decision, which concerned a merger between beer producers leading to the increase in market 
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concentration within that industry.136 The prosecution had alleged that the merger, being part of a 
strategy designed to earn the defendants significant market power with a view to setting supra-
competitive prices had infringed the competition rules.  137  In defence it was claimed that the 
arrangement could not be deemed to be injurious to competition on the ground that it affected a 
market that was highly regulated:138 consequently it could be presumed that the regulator would be 
acting in the public interest and in particular would ensure that price competition would not be 
unduly impaired, even within the constraints of the relevant regulatory framework.139   
         The Supreme Court of Ontario observed that the parties had agreed to the merger as a 
response to the challenges arising from the relaxation of the rules governing alcohol sales in the 
Province140 and that the concentration had not led to the creation of a position of monopoly141 or to 
an impairment of rivalry.142  The parties, however, were clearly constrained by the legislative 
framework for the control of the supply and consumption of liquor, as a result of which they could 
not outbid each other on price.143    Accordingly, the Court held that the question of whether the 
merger resulted in an “undue” restriction of competition should have been addressed in light of the 
features of the industry144  and in particular of the nature of the legislative framework concerning 
alcohol supply and sales and in particular of the extent to which provincial legislation had “removed” 
alcohol, whether partially or totally from the “competitive field”.  145    
         The Court observed that Ontario liquor control legislation placed significant restraints on the 
trade of alcoholic beverages and conferred to the Liquor Control Board the power to regulate liquor 
retail prices.146  Thus, it took the view that the merger could not have unduly restricted price 
competition, as alleged by the prosecution, either on its own or via the “collateral agreements” that 
the merged entity had stipulated with its rivals: it was held since the relevant prices had already 
been determined by the LCBO147 and to the extent that the “agreements” were nothing more than a 
commitment to the price that the Board had already determined, they could not have infringed the 
competition rules.148  Unless it could have been demonstrated that the “Board’s own prices” had 
been set at a level or in a manner that was detrimental to the public interest, for instance because it 
had been proven that the Board had been subjected to undue influence and therefore had acted 
beyond the public interest, neither the merger nor the “collateral agreements” could be regarded as 
attracting antitrust liability.149     
          The Canadian Breweries decision played a decisive role in indicating how the courts would 
approach the issue of the legality, in light of the federal competition rules, of the restrains on the 
freedom to trade and compete (especially on grounds of price) that provincial liquor control 
regulation imposed on the affected undertakings.150    It is argued that if it could be shown that the 
practices mandated as a result of provincial regulatory measures were “genuinely necessary” to 
attain the stated regulatory objectives, in the sense of being both “well-suited” and “co-essential” to 
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their accomplishment, they would have been regarded as falling within the remit of the RCD.  151  For 
this purpose, it would be indispensable to assess to what extent the arrangements  in question, 
including those resulting in a restriction of price competition, were consistent with the regulatory 
obligations resulting from the provincial enactments and whether they restricted competition more 
than was objectively necessary to achieve the public policy objectives they pursued.152 
             Against this background it is submitted that commercial practices that comply with statutory 
obligations to set prices above a specified minimum are likely to benefit from the application of the 
RCD and therefore remain immune from antitrust liability: unless it could be shown that these prices 
had been determined in a way that “circumvented” the regulator’s functions—either, e.g. because it 
restricted competition on other grounds or that the regulator itself, in setting those prices, had 
acted outside the remit of its statutory responsibilities--153 the arrangements that complied with the 
statutory minimum would represent “regulatory conduct” immune from antitrust liability. 154    
         In light of the forgoing analysis, it may be concluded that the Canadian courts’ approach to the 
complex interplay existing between the exercise at a “local” level of legitimate regulatory powers 
and the effective competition enforcement at federal level offers a very fitting example of how the 
scope of the “free market principles” can be shaped to reflect the impact of the rules governing the 
allocation of competence at different levels of government in a complex constitutional and 
institutional framework.  It is acknowledged that the RCD cannot be transplanted into EU law, due to 
the inevitable diversity of the Union, as a sui generis, multi -layered international polity, vis-à-vis 
Canada, which is instead a fully-fledged federal state.  However, it is legitimate to ask whether any 
elements of the Canadian acquis in this area can contribute to the “reshaping” of the scope of Article 
34 TFEU in a way that reflects the demands of the principle of conferral and its influence on the 
future attainment of the internal market goals. This question will be addressed in the next section.   
 
3.4. Restrictions on imports or “regulated conduct”? Canadian lessons for Article 34 TFEU 
 
Reconciling the right to regulate specific economic activities that the member states enjoy in 
accordance with the TFEU and the obligations that the Treaty itself imposes on national and EU 
authorities with a view to achieving the internal market objectives has been a vexed question that 
has shaped the remit of Article 34 TFEU as well as its relationship with the “public policy 
justification” enshrined in Article 36.  Taking as its starting point the challenge brought by the SWA 
against Scottish minimum alcohol pricing legislation, section 2 had shown how the Court of Justice of 
the EU has consistently championed the goal of market integration and, for that purpose, has upheld 
the role of price competition in virtually all cases in which the member states had sought to 
influence the freedom of traders to “charge as low as possible” for their commodities.    However, it 
was queried whether it may be justified in all cases to resort to such a wide reading of Article 34, 
especially when its application “straddled” in policy areas in respect of which, in light of the TFEU, 
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the member states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation.    Thus, it was suggested that there may be 
alternative solutions that can be designed to ensure that the continuing concern for market access 
through price competition can appropriately be counterbalanced against the  demands arising from 
the observance of higher rules concerning the allocation of competences to different levels of 
government.   
          The purpose of this section will be to consider how this “alternative” view of Article 34 could 
“look like”, kin light of the possible alternatives discussed so far.  It must be acknowledged, as a 
preliminary point, that it is not possible to “transplant” either the EU antitrust law approach to 
questions of ‘necessity’ of a prima facie restriction on competition.  Nonetheless, it is submitted that 
seeking to draw inferences from these approaches in order to explore how a more “selective” 
reading of Article 34 could look like if it was influenced by the application of Article 5 and, as far as 
the Scottish minimum alcohol pricing legislation was concerned, of Article 168 TFEU would be an 
appropriate response to this question, so long as its application entails a careful assessment of 
whether national regulatory measures are genuinely consistent with the need to attain certain, 
clearly identified public policy goals whose attainment belongs to the member states and entail no 
greater restrictions on the freedom to trade than was required to achieve these objectives.    First of 
all, it should be noted that the principle of conferral constitutes an over-arching rule of EU law, 
whose application affects all forms of Union action, including the way in which the EU Court of 
Justice interprets the internal market rules.  Second, it is observed that, as the Court of Justice itself 
recognised in its CIF judgment, price competition “(…) does not constitute the only effective form of 
competition or that to which absolute priority must in all circumstances be given (…)”.155   
          It is therefore argued that national restraints on the freedom to trade within the single market 
can—and given the importance of the principle of conferral, perhaps should—be appraised in light 
of common principles  and of a common approach, regardless of the aspect of competition on which 
they had an impact.  Although it is acknowledged that the respect for the principle of non -
discrimination, which forms the basis for the current EU acquis concerning, among others, minimum 
pricing, it is submitted that the careful analysis of the “appropriateness” and “inherency” of the 
national rules in issue in each case would ensure that the scope of the internal market principles and 
in particular of Article 34 TFEU is not unduly restricted.   
         It is consequently suggested that if national regulatory measures adopted by the member 
states in areas in which they enjoy a margin of discretion are “well -suited” to the achievement of the 
specific public policy objectives being engaged and so long as competition “(…) even if limited, (…) 
may operate through other factors”156 they could be regarded as representing a legitimate exercise 
of domestic regulatory prerogatives.157  It is submitted in this specific respect, that, if both of the 
proposed criteria are fulfilled, access to the market for imported goods would  only be restricted 
“incidentally”, that is to the extent that is required to satisfy the public interest demands being 
pursued not be completely precluded, and partially, on the ground that the latter could still 
“threaten” domestic commodities on the strength of, inter alia, their “quality” or “image”. 158 
           It is added that the examination of the Canadian Regulated Conduct Defence provides more 
support to this approach, since it does not only show that it is possible to balance broader concerns 
for open, competitive markets against the need to safeguard local regulatory prerogatives.159 It also 
demonstrates that these considerations can come into play in order to shape the scope of the 
competition rules so that their scope does not stretch as far as to de facto impair the remit and 
intensity of regulatory powers enjoyed by other public authorities on the basis of the relevant 
                                                                 
155
 See case C-198/01, CIF, cit. (fn. 119), para. 68. 
156
 Id., para. 69. 
157
 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, case 13/77, SA GB-INNO, [1977] ECR 2115, para. 13-14, 17; see also para. 41; 
also inter alia case C-145/88, Torfaen, cit. (fn. 73), para.14; see also, mutatis mutandis, Ladbroke, cit. (fn. 118), 
para. 34; Wouters, cit. (fn. 109), para. 99-100.. 
158
 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, Horsley, cit. (fn. 65), pp. 752. 
159
 See inter alia R v Canadian Breweries Ltd, [1960] OR 601, e.g. para. 18-21, 73, 98-99. 
21 
 
competence rules,160 by outlawing practices that are “necessarily incidental to the industry (or 
profession)” and are consequently “allowed” or “compelled” as part of a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme, laid out by provincial legislatures in the exercise of their constitutional prerogatives.161 
         In light of the above analysis, it may be asked whether the above discussion could have affected 
in any way the manner in which Article 34 was applied in the SWA case.  It is reminded that in the 
preliminary ruling the Scottish authorities had been recognised as enjoying significant, broad 
discretion as to the assessment of local health demands and as to the determination of the “policy 
response” thereto. 162  It is acknowledged in this respect that this conclusion had been reached by 
the Court in the context of the application of Article 36, and thus after a rather “swift” and 
unsurprising finding that Article 34 TFEU had been infringed.  Nonetheless, it is argued that, had the 
Court of Justice recognised the relevance of the principle of conferral vis-à-vis its interpretation of 
the internal market rules, it could have reached the conclusion that the minimum alcohol pricing 
rules had fallen outside the remit of Article 34 subject to the ‘inherency’ appraisal proposed earlier: 
if it could have been shown that the minimum pricing rules left the undertakings affected by their 
application free to compete on other grounds, such as quality or product image163 and were 
comparably more effective than other policy tools vis-à-vis attainment their stated harm-reduction 
goals,164 the referring court could have concluded that they had represented the expression of the 
legitimate exercise of regulatory powers enjoyed by the competent national authorities—i.e. the 
Scottish Government.  
         It can therefore be concluded that reconciling the achievement of the internal market goals 
within the framework of conferred competences enshrined in the TFEU is a very complex question to 
which Article 34 TFEU cannot give a full answer.  This is, however, not an impossible task: recourse 
to established approaches to the interpretation of this provision, enshrined in EU law or in the law of 
other jurisdictions, could re-balance these concomitant, if not prima facie mutually opposing, 
concerns and thus ensure that the EU internal market remains a truly “shared regulatory space” 
whose functioning must comply at all times with the principle of conferral.  
 
4. National public interest regulation in the EU internal market: making a case for a new Article 
34? Tentative conclusions… 
 
Striking a balance between the integrity of the EU single market and the legitimate “right to 
regulate” enjoyed by the member states in areas where, in accordance with the Founding Treaties, 
they retain competence to act alongside the Union itself has been extremely challenging throughout 
the history of European integration.    This contribution has argued that since the principles of 
conferral and subsidiarity are central to the Union’s normative and institutional architecture and 
therefore are binding on all its institutions, including the CJEU, time may be mature for reflecting the 
shared nature of the competence that the Union and the member states enjoy vis-à-vis the 
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achievement of the internal market objectives in the way in which we interpret the free movement 
of goods’ provisions.  
         Relying on the analysis of the 2015 SWA preliminary ruling as a clear example of this 
interaction, it was argued that while this decision had been consistent with existing precedent, it had 
not considered whether the minimum unit pricing rules could have been deemed to fall outside the 
remit of the free movement rules on the ground of being the expression of legitimate regulatory 
prerogatives in the area of public health protection.  On this basis, more general questions 
concerning the nature of the competences enjoyed by the EU and the member states in the area of 
public health protection were examined.  It was argued that the commitment to the principle of 
conferral could provide a convincing argument in favour of incorporating considerations linked to 
the allocation of powers at Union and national level into the way in which Article 34 TFEU is read, 
especially in respect of domestic measures that, while incidentally affecting the flow of interstate 
trade, seek to achieve “internal demands” of public policy  in respect of which the national 
authorities retain significant powers of appreciation.  It was added that the over-arching nature of 
this principle and its importance in the overall scheme of the Treaties would justify applying such a 
more “discerning” reading of the freedom of movement of goods’ rule even to cases such as the 
SWA litigation, where what is at issue is the attempt of national authorities to restrict the right of 
traders to decide “how high or how low” to price certain goods in order to meet certain public 
interest demands. 
         This article examined a number of alternative “takes” vis-à-vis the current interpretation of 
Article 34 TFEU, ranging from the internal market-based “mandatory requirements” doctrine to the 
EU competition law concept of state action defence, to the “exotic” response given by the Canadian 
federal and provincial courts to similar concerns, i.e. the “regulated conduct defence”.  It was argued 
that while none of the above approaches can be fully “transplanted” to dealing with internal market 
issues, they can be read as indicating that it is possible to develop a framework for assessment that 
reflects in the way in which the remit of the internal market rules is determined the demands of the 
principle of conferral.  For this purpose, it was proposed in section 3.3 that once it had been 
established that the member states had acted in areas in respect to which they were competent, the 
measures in issue could have been deemed to fall outside the scope of Article 34 TFEU subject to an 
assessment of their “appropriateness” vis-à-vis their stated objective and their “inherency” to its 
attainment—in other words, of whether the imposition of these regulatory limits left intact the 
possibility to compete on grounds other than those affected by the regulatory measures in issue.   
        In light of the forgoing, it may be queried “where we stand” when it comes to the internal 
market scrutiny of national measures such as the 2012 Scottish minimum alcohol pricing rules, 
whose nature is “purely regulatory” and whose interstate trade impact is instead merely incidental.  
It is submitted that the Court’s decision should be welcomed to the extent that it makes clear that 
minimum pricing rules represent an “appropriate” regulatory tool to deal with the public health 
needs and demands of local populations as well as recognising that it is for the member states to 
assess the nature of these demands and to decide how to address them.    However, it is regrettable 
that the CJEU, by relying on the abstract notion of “hindrance to market access”, concluded perhaps 
too swiftly that the minimum alcohol pricing rules had infringed Article 34.   It is acknowledged that 
any interference with the freedom to set prices and to compete on this ground should be carefully 
assessed.  Nonetheless, it is submitted that the observance of Article 168 could have justified 
addressing the more general issue of whether the nature of the powers enjoyed respectively by the 
EU and the member states in this area could have had any bearing on the appraisal of national 
measures that affect this aspect of rivalry in light of Article 34 TFEU.  It is therefore hoped that the 
Court will come to draw clearer boundaries between permissible and impermissible restraints on the 
freedom of movement rights so as to safeguard the regulatory powers that the Treaty expressly 
leaves to national authorities, without losing sight of the integrationist goal at the core of the EU 
Treaties.165 
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